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Abstract
While women have expanded their footprint in corporate America in recent years, they are
still underrepresented in the upper echelons of corporate governance, specifically in boardrooms,
which dictate the direction of a company. At the current rate, it will take more than four decades
before women’s representation on corporate boards reaches parity with that of men. Women face
obstacles that make it difficult to rise in the ranks of corporate America. This can be attributed to
numerous factors that collectively burden women with expectations that are at odds with success.
These factors include low representation of women in traditional pipelines to board seats, lack
of flexibility in the workplace, male-driven work cultures, and disproportionate mentorship and
sponsorship opportunities.
Why should companies care about diversity? The importance of diversity can be reinforced by
both business and moral arguments. The business case highlights the value-maximizing effect of
diverse boards while the moral arguments emphasize that gender diversity is the “right thing to
do.” However, despite these arguments in favor of gender diversity, the efforts to improve diver-
sity on boards have been lacking. This Note highlights the current landscape and suggests ways to
break down barriers to increase women’s representation in the boardroom. A balanced boardroom
with more women’s perspectives will lead to an improved understanding of a company’s stake-
holders and its customers’ needs. Increased diversity can also enhance a board’s ability to meet its
fiduciary duties.
KEYWORDS: Corporate Law, Boardroom, Boardroom Diversity, Proxy Access
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While women have expanded their footprint in corporate America in 
recent years, they are still underrepresented in the upper echelons of 
corporate governance, specifically in boardrooms, which dictate the 
direction of a company. At the current rate, it will take more than 
four decades before women’s representation on corporate boards 
reaches parity with that of men. Women face obstacles that make it 
difficult to rise in the ranks of corporate America. This can be 
attributed to numerous factors that collectively burden women with 
expectations that are at odds with success. These factors include low 
representation of women in traditional pipelines to board seats, lack 
of flexibility in the workplace, male-driven work cultures, and 
disproportionate mentorship and sponsorship opportunities. 
Why should companies care about diversity? The importance of 
diversity can be reinforced by both business and moral arguments. 
The business case highlights the value-maximizing effect of diverse 
boards while the moral arguments emphasize that gender diversity is 
the “right thing to do.” However, despite these arguments in favor of 
gender diversity, the efforts to improve diversity on boards have 
been lacking. This Note highlights the current landscape and 
suggests ways to break down barriers to increase women’s 
representation in the boardroom. A balanced boardroom with more 
women’s perspectives will lead to an improved understanding of a 
company’s stakeholders and its customers’ needs. Increased 
diversity can also enhance a board’s ability to meet its fiduciary 
duties. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Oracle of Omaha, Warren Buffett, has said his success is partly 
due to the fact that he only needed to compete with half the population.1 
Unfortunately, when surveying the landscape of corporate America, it 
appears that, as is generally the case, Buffett is correct in his assessment. 
While women continue to outpace men in educational achievement, this 
has not translated to increased representation of women in the corporate 
sphere, as evident by the lack of diversity in boardrooms. 
Women face numerous obstacles in their rise to senior positions. 
Firstly, it is challenging for women to attain board positions when the 
prerequisite is often experience in a senior management position, a level 
at which they already face significant underrepresentation. Secondly, the 
workplace has failed to accommodate mothers and provide the 
flexibility that they need in balancing child rearing and their 
professional lives. This has enabled the creation of a class of dependent 
women who adjust their careers to accommodate their spouses, further 
enabling men to continue to dominate the public sphere. Motherhood 
triggers assumptions that women are less committed to their jobs and are 
therefore less qualified. While women and men both practice work-life 
balance, they do not share the same burdens because typically, women 
disproportionately bear the costs of having a family. 
Furthermore, the male-driven culture is a hindrance to women’s 
success as they face pressure to conform to established male norms. 
Women and men are biologically different, and there are cultural norms 
and stereotypes to which each gender is expected to conform. If women 
stray from what is expected, it hurts their chances of success. The male-
dominant corporate culture only reinforces this notion by appointing 
male directors who will “fit in” with the status quo. 
Moreover, the “glass ceiling” that caps women’s success also 
prevents highly successful women from reaching positions where they 
are able to receive the proper mentorship and sponsorship opportunities 
that men have. In the unlikely event that women do receive such 
mentorship, the advice is usually skewed by unexamined mindsets in the 
workforce or lacks the proper direction. For the first time in American 
history, single women outnumber married women. This has significant 
ramifications, as there are a greater number of women who are 
                                                                                                                 
 1. SHERYL SANDBERG, LEAN IN: WOMEN, WORK AND THE WILL TO LEAD 6 (2013). 
206 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
independent and the workforce will presumably need to adjust 
accordingly. However, the extent to which single women will stimulate 
change depends on women stepping up to call for the progress they 
desire. 
Where women are represented in boardrooms, certain patterns have 
emerged. A lack of a “critical mass” of women hinders their ability to 
have their voices heard. Moreover, there is a pattern of boards 
appointing one “trophy” woman to multiple boards, creating the illusion 
that companies care about diversity and inclusiveness, when in reality, 
companies are recycling the same women. In other cases, corporations 
fail to find the lack of diversity in board positions problematic and 
therefore do not prioritize remedying the issue at all. 
Why should companies care about diversity? Diversity is important 
because investors care about the equity returns in their companies 
(which are affected by board heterogeneity), and the concept of the 
“business case” is in line with their investment agendas. Another 
argument is a moral argument, which states that diversity is important 
because it is simply the “right thing to do.” Appointing more women on 
boards would be a more accurate reflection of society and signal to 
consumers the value companies place on equal representation. 
While initiatives to improve diversity on boards exist, these efforts 
have fallen short. Overall, there is an absence of legislation on the state 
level. However, there have been some voluntary approaches aimed at 
setting target numbers of women on boards. Regulation S-K, put forth 
by the SEC, mandates disclosure of a company’s board composition, but 
the law is more suggestive than compulsory in nature and has yet to 
yield significant change. Compared to countries around the world that 
have taken a more hard-line approach by instituting mandatory quotas, 
the United States lags behind in increasing gender equality on boards. 
This Note highlights the current landscape and suggests ways to 
break down barriers to increase women’s representation in the 
boardroom. While this Note calls for more women on boards, it is not an 
invitation to hand out board seats to women. There is a need for women 
to achieve their rightful positions because of their qualifications, and not 
solely for the sake of diversity. A balanced boardroom with more 
women’s perspectives will lead to an improved understanding of a 
company’s stakeholders and its customers’ needs, and allow directors to 
adeptly perform their roles as fiduciaries to the corporation. 
Part I of this Note provides background on the board of directors’ 
role in a corporation and the current status of women’s representation in 
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boardrooms, highlights the barriers women face in rising to higher 
ranks, and analyzes why diversity matters. Part II describes recent U.S. 
efforts to improve diversity, including both state- and federal-level 
initiatives. Lastly, Part III outlines some concrete suggestions for 
improving diversity on boards moving forward. 
I . BACKGROUND 
A. DIRECTORS 
1. The Role of Corporate Boards 
The board of directors plays a crucial role in a corporation’s 
decision-making process.2 Given its role as the corporation’s strategic 
leader, the board of directors is often considered the “epicenter of U.S. 
corporate governance.”3 The board’s role is determined by state statutes, 
which safeguard the board of director’s management of the 
corporation’s affairs.4 Directors are responsible for developing strategies 
through problem solving and critical analysis. According to the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Principles 
of Corporate Governance, “[t]he corporate governance framework 
should ensure the strategic guidance of the company, the effective 
monitoring of management by the board, and the board’s accountability 
to the company and the shareholders.”5 
The corporate structure lends itself to a separation of ownership and 
control, whereby one group—the directors—controls the corporation, 
and another group—the stakeholders—provides the capital. 6  This 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Rajeev Gupta, The Pursuit of Diversity in the Boardroom, EXECRANK, 
https://execrank.com/board-of-directors-articles/pursuit-diversity-boardroom/ [https:// 
perma.cc/NXE8-XJ7S] (last visited Sept. 25, 2016). 
 3. JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES 
BROKEN 51 (2008). 
 4. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (West 2016). 
 5. ORGANISATION OF ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., G-20/OECD PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2015), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/g20-oecd-
principles-of-corporate-governance-2015_9789264236882-en [https://perma.cc/9RKJ-
QCGC]. 
 6. Kose John & Lemma W. Senbet, Corporate Governance and Board 
Effectiveness, 22 J. BANKING & FIN. 371, 372-373 (1998). 
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separation of ownership and control inherent in a corporation gives rise 
to potential conflicts between the corporation’s stakeholders and 
directors. 7  Corporate governance is a set of practices and rules that 
handles this conflict.8 Given the directors’ responsibility to guide the 
corporation and guard company assets, they would be prudent to 
implement the principles critical to good corporate governance, one of 
which is the board’s duty to monitor.9 The monitoring role is important 
because corporate ownership is often dispersed, which makes it 
challenging for shareholders to effectively monitor director behavior.10 
Therefore, it is the directors’ job to serve as the shareholders’ guardian 
and engage in effective risk oversight and crisis management. Directors 
must foresee challenges that lie ahead and apply their expertise to help 
their companies navigate such obstacles. In a constantly shifting 
business landscape, boards must be progressive in order for their 
companies to maintain a competitive position.11 
Due to shareholders’ lack of control over a corporation’s ordinary 
business operations and their need to rely on directors and officers to 
manage the corporation, directors and officers owe fiduciary duties to 
the shareholders.12 Fiduciary duties are a feature of state law and include 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Id. This conflict creates an “agency problem.” Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The Important Work of 
Boards of Directors (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/important-work-
of-boards-of-directors.html [https://perma.cc/2RWA-7L6D]. Cf. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 
A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000) (stating that “[a]spirational ideals of good corporate 
governance . . . are highly desirable, often tend to benefit stockholders, [and] sometimes 
reduce litigation . . . [b]ut they are not required by the corporation law and do not define 
standards of liability”). 
 10. Large corporations especially have a problem with the monitoring duty because 
their ownership is typically even more distributed. John & Senbet, supra note 6, at 372. 
As a result, individual shareholders do not have enough interest to validate spending 
time and money to monitor managers and instead rely on others’ efforts to do so. Id. 
 11. Two-thirds of directors surveyed in a 2014 Spencer Stuart survey agree that 
boards need to be savvy and believe that board turnover is “important” or “critically 
important.” Steven A. Rosenblum, Karessa L. Cain & Sebastian V. Niles, NYSE: 
Corporate Governance Guide, NYSE (Dec. 2014), https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/ 
nyse/listing/NYSE_Corporate_Governance_Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/57VQ-6HK3]  
[hereinafter Corp. Guide]; Aguilar, supra note 9. 
 12. See Roel C. Campos, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks Before the 
CNMV Corporate Governance and Securities Markets Conference (Feb. 8, 2007), https: 
//www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch020807rcc.htm [https://perma.cc/XQQ9-E7J5]. 
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the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.13 Under the shareholder primacy 
model, the board’s central role is to maximize shareholder wealth.14 To 
fulfill their duties, loyal and prudent directors should maximize long-
term value creation for the company.15 Shareholders sometimes contest 
the board’s corporate decisions, such as a decision to make charitable 
contributions. 16  However, corporate statutes allow directors to use 
corporate profits for corporate donations and social goals.17 Charitable 
giving provides a means for a company to create a benevolent image, 
maintain a devoted customer-base, and can be an advantageous tax 
strategy.18 
Fiduciary duties provide recourse for shareholders when the 
directors’ actions run contrary to the goal of maximizing company 
profits or are not in the best interests of the corporation.19 Specifically, 
                                                                                                                 
 13. There is also the duty of good faith, which is a component of the duty of care 
and the duty of loyalty. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (West 2016) 
(disallowing limitation of liability for duty of care violations resulting from bad-faith 
actions); Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006) 
(holding that the failure to act in good faith is a factor considered when evaluating a 
potential breach of the duty of loyalty). 
 14. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (expressing the 
position that profits should be managers’ primary goal); see also AM. LAW INST., 
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(a) 
(1994) (“[A] corporation . . . should have as its objective the conduct of business 
activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.”). 
 15. See TIAA-CREF POLICY STATEMENT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (6th ed. 
2011), http://www1.tiaacref.org/ucm/groups/content/@ap_ucm_p_tcp/documents/docu 
ment/tiaa01007871.pdf [https://perma.cc/DVB3-HLRU]. Companies often over-
emphasize the short-term financial outcomes. According to a March 2014 McKinsey 
and Canada Pension Plan Investment Board survey, 47% of 604 executives and 
directors from around the world said their companies’ boards overemphasized 
immediate financial outcomes and 74% of those who were currently directors took the 
responsibility themselves. Dominic Barton & Mark Wiseman, Where Boards Fall 
Short, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2015, https://hbr.org/2015/01/where-boards-fall-
short [https://perma.cc/GSG4-QTR5]. 
 16. John A. Pearce II, The Rights of Shareholders in Authorizing Corporate 
Philanthropy, 60 VILL. L. REV. 251, 252 (2015). 
 17. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 733, 763 (2005). 
 18. Pearce II, supra note 16, at 252. 
 19. See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 682 (finding that the director and controlling 
shareholder, Henry Ford, subordinated shareholder interests to those of the customers 
by not paying dividends). 
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shareholders can bring a derivative claim when the board breaches its 
fiduciary duties.20 In many cases, directors have the protection of the 
business judgment rule, a safe harbor that provides deferential treatment 
to directors.21 Courts give directors some latitude to use their expertise 
in making business decisions, overlooking losses that may have 
occurred as a result of managerial decisions made by an officer or 
director in good faith.22 
2. Board Size and Director Terms 
Corporate boards have the freedom and flexibility to pick the 
individual board members and set limitations on the size of the board. 
State statutes require directors to be elected annually,23 but the board 
may also be staggered into thirds, should the company choose to do so.24 
Term limits vary from company to company: in 2014, only 3% of 
boards of S&P 500 companies stipulated director term limits, and the 
average term for a director for all boards was 8.4 years. 25  Another 
method boards have adopted to stimulate board refreshment is the 
establishment of mandatory retirement ages for its directors.26 In 2014, 
73% of S&P 500 boards had formal policies regarding board member 
                                                                                                                 
 20. A breach of fiduciary duty can include inadequately informed decisions, self-
dealing, failure to monitor, deliberate malice, illegal acts, the taking of an opportunity 
that belongs to the principal, and interference with the shareholders’ right to vote. See, 
e.g., Miller v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 
2003), Cooke v. Oolie, No. CIV. A. 11132, 2000 WL 710199 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2000); 
In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996); Blasius 
Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., No. CIV. A. 9720, 1988 WL 909333 (Del. Ch. Aug. 15, 
1988); Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). 
 21. See Ashley Schoenjahn, Note, New Faces of Corporate Responsibility: Will 
New Entity Forms Allow Businesses to Do Good?, 37 J. CORP. L. 453, 456 (2012). 
 22. Corp. Guide, supra note 11, at 111. This rule prevents courts from finding 
directors at fault if they relied on “any rational business purpose” when making their 
decision. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971). 
 23. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (West 2016). 
 24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (West 2016). 
 25. Corp. Guide, supra note 11, at 72-73; SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 2014, 
https://www.spencerstuart.com/~/media/pdf%20files/research%20and%20insight%20p
dfs/ssbi2014web14nov2014.pdf%20target= [https://perma.cc/GG93-E2ED]. 
 26. Corp. Guide, supra note 11, at 48. 
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retirement age.27 The number of individuals on the board also varies by 
organization, usually depending on the size and scope of the company. 
According to a 2014 survey of public companies, the average board size 
was about ten directors, with larger companies having more directors.28 
3. Board Committees 
The board of directors typically creates individual committees to 
enhance oversight effectiveness and delegate board responsibilities.29 
The allocation of responsibilities among these committees ensures 
effective corporate governance and enables the committees to focus on 
particular issues that may be too large or complex for the entire board; 
thus, the committees offer input on significant matters, guarantee that 
the board’s work is informed, and recommend policies subject to the 
entire board’s approval.30 The three most fundamental board committees 
are the compensation committee, the audit committee, and the 
nominating and governance committee.31  The number of committees 
and their members varies by company, and boards have the freedom to 
select the size and individual members of each committee.32 The number 
                                                                                                                 
 27. Id. at 73. About half of the directors noted that there is a compulsory retirement 
age on their boards. Id. at 48. 
 28. SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 2015, https://www.spencerstuart.com/~/media/ 
pdf%20files/research%20and%20insight%20pdfs/ssbi-2015_110215-web.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/4VV6-FZSG]; see also David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Gender 
Diversity on Boards: The Future is Almost Here, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 24, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/03/25 
/gender-diversity-on-boards-the-future-is-almost-here/ [https://perma.cc/B48G-HDRM] 
(stating that large firms tend to have larger boards). 
 29. These committees are permitted by state statute. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
8, § 141(c) (West 2016). 
 30. Corp. Guide, supra note 11, at 91. 
 31. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS 
REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN INCLUDE FEDERAL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS (Dec. 
2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/674008.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7ZC-6HYF]  
[hereinafter GAO Report]. Companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange are 
required to have these three committees. Corp. Guide, supra note 11, at 102. 
 32. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (West 2016). Companies may have other 
committees depending on necessity and the industry. Other board committees include 
finance, fundraising, product development, promotion and sales, public relations, 
research, environmental, safety, and programming. Derick Hughes, The Changing Face 
of Nomination Committees Globally, ETHICAL BOARDROOM (Feb. 17, 2014), http://ethic 
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of women on each of these fundamental board committees is roughly 
indicative of women’s representation on boards generally.33 
Although state law dictates director responsibilities, it typically 
does not require director independence.34 In 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (“SOX”) was enacted to improve disclosure and financial reporting; 
although it did not expressly address board composition, SOX mandated 
the presence of an entirely independent audit committee.35 The New 
York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) guidelines took a broader approach by 
requiring its listed companies to have a majority of independent 
directors on their boards.36 The NYSE guidelines define independent 
directors as those with “no material relationship with the company, 
either directly or as a partner, shareholder, or officer of an organization 
that has a relationship with the company.”37 The rules specifically forbid 
certain subsets from being considered independent: individuals who 
have a significant financial stake in the company, individuals related to 
top executives, and employees who are only three years removed from 
the company.38 
                                                                                                                 
alboardroom.com/leadership/changing-face-nomination-committees-globally/ [https:// 
perma.cc/FKX4-5TJ6]. 
 33. Katz & McIntosh, supra note 28. 
 34. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (West 2016); Theo Francis & Joann S. 
Lublin, Boards Get More Independent But Ties Endure, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 19, 2016), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/boards-get-more-independent-but-ties-endure-1453234607 
[https://perma.cc/SR2R-CYQR] (“[F]ederal law requires board committees overseeing 
executive pay or company audits to include only independent directors.”). 
 35. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (2012); Cynthia A. Glassman, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, Board Diversity: The 21st Century Challenge: “The New Regulatory Climate 
and Impact on Board Composition” (Nov. 11, 2005), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
spch111105cag.htm [https://perma.cc/3QGX-4ZFT] [hereinafter Glassman Speech]. 
 36. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.01 (2013), 
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm/Help/mapContent.asp?sec=lcm-sections&title=sx-rulin 
g-nyse-policymanual_303A.02&id=chp_1_4_3_2 [https://perma.cc/C3HA-WHSW]  
(last visited Aug. 20, 2016). The Sarbanes Oxley Act, coupled with the listing 
requirements, has helped fuel the change in composition of corporate boards; as there is 
more regulation and oversight, companies must look at a larger group of candidates 
(which has opened up opportunities for women). Glassman Speech, supra note 35. 
 37. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.02 (2013), 
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm/Help/mapContent.asp?sec=lcm-sections&title=sx-rulin 
g-nyse-policymanual_303A.02&id=chp_1_4_3_3 [https://perma.cc/N3UR-PTK5] (last 
visited Aug. 20, 2016). 
 38. Id.; Francis & Lublin, supra note 34. 
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Since the board of directors is essentially the company’s compass, 
board composition is a critical part of the equation. Although 
nominating processes differ across companies, the board of directors 
generally creates a nominating and governance committee that reviews 
and recommends nominees to the board as a whole.39 The nominating 
committee is responsible for oversight during the nomination process, 
and is primarily tasked with evaluating candidates for the board, 
identifying the traits and talents that are required for candidates to obtain 
a board nomination, and warranting nominee excellence.40 
Given their role in presenting new members to the board for 
appointment, nominating committees have the power to change the face 
of a company. 41  Consequently, the members of the nominating 
committees are also the ones held accountable by shareholders when the 
committee seems to have recruited inexperienced individuals to the 
board.42 It is crucial to ensure that new appointees are qualified and can 
effectively run the company. Committee members, therefore, must keep 
in mind the enduring life of the corporation, the corporation’s best 
interests, and the applicable rules of corporate governance while 
selecting new board members.43 Accordingly, the most desired traits in 
new members are prior financial and industry experience, experience as 
a CEO, and an understanding of information technology.44  Surveyed 
directors also mention a recent emphasis on candidates with a 
background in marketing or social media.45 
                                                                                                                 
 39. The nominating and governance committee also handles matters relating to 
corporate governance principles, but the nominating role is the primary interest for 
purposes of this Note. See e.g., Morgan Stanley, Nominating and Governance 
Committee Charter (as amended Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.morganstanley.com/about-
us-governance/ndchart [https://perma.cc/ZLL9-P6SS] (last visited Mar. 6, 2017). 
 40. Hughes, supra note 32. See generally Corp. Guide, supra note 11, at 91-96. 
 41. In the 2013 “What Directors Think” survey by Spencer Stuart, about two-thirds 
of directors stated that endorsements from existing board members served as the most 
fruitful resource for new board members, and search firms were the second most 
effective. Corp. Guide, supra note 11, at 49. 
 42. Hughes, supra note 32. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Corp. Guide, supra note 11, at 48. 
 45. Id. 
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B. BOARDROOMS 
1. Number of Women on Boards Generally 
According to the 2015 Women in S&P’s 500 Companies Survey by 
Catalyst, a nonprofit organization dedicated to expanding opportunities 
for women in business, women represent 44.3% of the labor force and 
comprise 36.4% of mid-level managerial positions.46 However, women 
hold only 19.9% of board seats, 25.1% of executive/senior level 
management positions, and only 4.4% of CEO positions. 47  Women 
occupied only 16.6% of Fortune 500 board seats in 2012 and that 
number increased by only two percentage points in six years.48 
Numerous other reports have documented the dearth of women on 
boards. The United States Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) 
released a report in December 2015 on the status of women on corporate 
boards, finding that in 1997, women held 8% of board seats and that 
number increased to about 16% in 2014.49 Results also showed that the 
number of women on boards varied across organizations.50 Generally, 
women were more adequately represented on boards of large companies 
than on those of small or medium companies.51 Women comprised 12% 
of board positions in small companies, 15% of board positions in 
medium companies, and 19% of board positions in large companies.52 
Furthermore, 33% of small companies, 17% of medium companies, and 
4% of large companies had boards with no women. 53  In terms of 
industry-specific figures, women were most represented in boardrooms 
of the household and personal products industry at about 26%, followed 
by food, beverage, tobacco, and utilities industries at 21%, and in the 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Women in S&P 500 Companies, CATALYST (Sept. 19, 2016), http://www. 
catalyst.org/knowledge/women-sp-500-companies [https://perma.cc/Y5VV-GAD5]; see 
also Corp. Guide, supra note 11, at 84. 
 47. Women in S&P 500 Companies, supra note 46. 
 48. Boris Groysberg & Deborah Bell, Dysfunction in the Boardroom, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (June 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/06/dysfunction-in-the-boardroom [https://perma. 
cc/XS75-9W9M]. 
 49. GAO Report, supra note 31, at 8. 
 50. Id. at 10. 
 51. S&P 500 companies are considered large while S&P 400 are considered 
medium and S&P 600 are considered small. Id. at 11. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
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media industry at 20%. 54  Women were least represented in the 
boardrooms of the semiconductor industry at 8.8%, energy industry at 
10.5%, automobiles components industry at around 11%, and in real 
estate at 12.9%.55 
The GAO study also found a difference in the age and tenure 
characteristics of men and women on boards. 56  On average, female 
directors were younger than male directors; 45% of women were under 
the age of sixty compared to 30% of men.57 Also, female board directors 
had shorter tenures on boards than males; 42.1% of women served on 
boards for less than five years compared to 30.2% of men, while only 
10.4% of women served for more than fifteen years compared to 18.2% 
of men.58 
An earlier report titled, Missing Pieces: Women and Minorities on 
Fortune 500 Boards described the status of women in corporate 
boardrooms between 2004 and 2010.59 The report found that for Fortune 
100 companies, Caucasian men alone comprised 67.9% of seats in 
2012.60 New Jersey Senator Bob Menendez released a survey in 2014 of 
sixty-nine Fortune 100 companies and found that only 22.9% of 
corporate directors were female.61 
Since the 1970s, the number of women graduating from American 
legal, medical, and business graduate programs has been steadily 
increasing. In the 1970s, women were graduating with advanced degrees 
at a rate of 30%, which increased to more than 40% in the 1990s.62 In 
                                                                                                                 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 12. 
 57. Women’s average age was 60.4 years and men’s was 63.8 years. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. ALLIANCE FOR BOARD DIVERSITY, MISSING PIECES: WOMEN AND MINORITIES 
ON FORTUNE 500 BOARDS: 2012 ALLIANCE FOR BOARD DIVERSITY (ABD) CENSUS 
(2013), http://www.catalyst.org/system/files/2012_abd_missing_pieces_final_8_15_13. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/GA42-WU2N]. 
 60. Id.; see also Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The Abysmal 
Lack of Diversity in Corporate Boardrooms Is Growing Worse (May 2, 2011), http:// 
www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch050211laa.htm [https://perma.cc/Z4CV-LH97]. 
 61. BOB MENENDEZ, 2014 CORPORATE DIVERSITY SURVEY (2015), https://www.me 
nendez.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2014%20Corporate%20Diversity%20Survey%20Re
port.pdf [https://perma.cc/XH75-2RST]. 
 62. Douglas M. Branson, Pathways for Women to Senior Management Positions 
and Board Seats: An A to Z List, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1555, 1555 (2012). 
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2013, women in the 25 to 34 age group were more likely than men in the 
same age group to receive college and graduate degrees.63 Today, 9.7 
million women are enrolled in undergraduate programs, representing 
more than half of all undergraduates. 64  This balance between the 
genders, however, is not reflected at the senior positions of corporations 
where the proportion of women has remained stagnant. 65  The facts 
demonstrate that women are highly represented in the lower ranks of 
companies but noticeably absent from senior positions, which are 
instead inundated with men.66 Accordingly, women’s opinions are not 
proportionately captured in corporate decision-making.67 Gender-blind 
studies demonstrate the biases women encounter even when they are 
being evaluated for hiring: “[o]ne study found that replacing a woman’s 
name with a man’s name on a resume improved the odds of getting 
hired by 61 percent.”68 
Gender inequality remains an issue among 99% of Fortune 500 
companies’ boards.69 The GAO report found that even if women were 
                                                                                                                 
 63. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN EDUCATION AND 
THE WORKFORCE (2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/womens_ 
slides_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RT2-JJSX]. 
 64. In contrast, male students’ enrollment was at 7.6 million, comprising 44% of 
total undergraduate enrollment. Undergraduate Enrollment, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. 
STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cha.asp [https://perma.cc/Q4Y5-
YWPS]. Brande Stellings, Vice President of Corporate Board Services at Catalyst, has 
aptly asked, “[I]n terms of workforce and talent pool, why would you only want to 
choose from half of the available candidates?” Emily Peck, Most Men Don’t Care 
About Diversity in the Boardroom, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.huffin 
gtonpost.com/entry/corporate- boarddiversity_us_561510b6e4b0cf9984d7af01 [https:// 
perma.cc/6G5C-2R9C]. 
 65. SANDBERG, supra note 1. 
 66. Id. at 15. A study spanning twenty-eight countries that evaluated data for 1.7 
million employees established that “although women constitute 41% of the global 
workforce only 19% of executives are female.” PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, A 
MARKETPLACE WITHOUT BOUNDARIES? RESPONDING TO DISRUPTION (2015), 
http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/ceo-survey/2015/assets/pwc-18th-annual-global-ceo-survey 
-jan-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/YYS6-33AY] [hereinafter PwC Study] (citing MERCER, 
WHEN WOMEN THRIVE, BUSINESSES THRIVE (2014)). 
 67. SANDBERG, supra note 1, at 5-6. 
 68. How to Be a Workplace MVP, LEAN IN, http://leanin.org/tips/mvp [https://perm 
a.cc/6GKV-P3ZJ]. 
 69. Claire Groden, Just 35% of Male Directors Think Having a Female Board 
Member Is ‘Very Important’, FORTUNE (Oct. 6, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/10/06/b 
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appointed to all imminent board openings, the number of women in the 
boardroom would still not equal that of men until 2024.70 These figures 
demonstrate the great disparity between the pool of qualified female 
candidates and the limited number of women on corporate boards. 
2. Companies that Market Products to Women 
Companies in the household and personal products industry that 
market products primarily to women also exhibit a striking 
underrepresentation of women in senior positions and boardrooms, 
although they fare better than companies in other industries.71 Recent 
attention has mainly been focused on the lack of women in senior 
positions within stereotypically male-dominated industries, such as in 
technology. However, the dearth of women there can be more readily 
explained by the lack of female candidates for higher positions in the 
tech industry.72 A report from National Student Clearinghouse noted a 
decline in the number of women pursuing bachelor degrees in science, 
technology, engineering, and math disciplines over the past decade.73 
The gender disparity was most apparent in the field of computer science: 
in 2004, 23% of degrees in the field went to women, and this number 
                                                                                                                 
oard-member-diversity/ [https://perma.cc/4NQN-2GWH]. 
 70. The GAO report stated that “it could take about 10 years from 2014 for women 
to comprise 30% percent of board directors and more than 40 years for the 
representation of women on boards to match that of men.” GAO Report, supra note 31, 
at 9. NY Representative Carolyn Maloney has said, “If we do nothing, we won’t reach 
gender parity on corporate boards for at least another 40 years.” Press Release, Office 
of Carolyn B. Maloney, Maloney’s Newly Introduced Gender Diversity in Corporate 
Leadership Act of 2016 Gains Backing of U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Mar. 9, 2016), 
https://maloney.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/maloney-s-newly-introduced-
gender-diversity-in-corporate-leadership-act [https://perma.cc/EK8G-M2NL] 
[hereinafter Maloney Press Release]. 
 71. See, e.g., Jillian Berman, Even Companies That Sell Tampons Are Run by Men, 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 21, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/21/women 
-companies_n_5563256.html [https://perma.cc/YJ98-Z3ZB]. 
 72. See Catherine Rampell, Women Falling Behind in STEM Bachelor’s Degrees, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/rampage/wp/2015 
/01/27/women-falling-behind-in-stem-bachelors-degrees/ [https://perma.cc/K8PJ-RZ 
ZU] (discussing the low percentage of women graduating in the fields of science, 
technology, engineering, and math). 
 73. Id. 
218 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
further decreased to only 18% in 2014.74 On the other hand, there is no 
lack of female candidates for higher positions within companies that 
make products geared towards women because women are well-
represented in those companies’ entry-level and mid-managerial 
positions.75 
Catalyst and the Huffington Post analyzed the board composition of 
the largest companies that manufacture products marketed toward 
women.76 This classification spanned a wide variety of organizations: 
makeup suppliers, department stores, consumer goods manufacturers, 
and female-oriented clothing companies, including companies such as 
Macy’s, Nordstrom, Procter & Gamble, Sears, L’Oréal, Kimberly-Clark, 
and Johnson & Johnson.77 Of the nineteen companies included in the 
2014 analysis, only one had a board of directors that was majority 
female and only one had a C-Suite that was comprised of a majority of 
women.78 These results are particularly troubling, given the fact that 
women are the primary consumers of these products. Women’s keen 
understanding of customer desires in these fields gives them an 
advantage over their male counterparts when it comes to making 
marketing decisions.79 
The deficiency of women in leadership roles at these companies 
might provide insight as to the reason there are merchandises, 
advertisements, and promotions that are marketed toward women but 
instead appear inaccessible and outdated.80 Men comprise a majority of 
senior-level management, using data and market research to make 
decisions about marketing beauty and feminine products, which they 
personally do not use or understand.81 Tom Falk, the CEO of Kimberly-
                                                                                                                 
 74. Id. 
 75. Berman, supra note 71. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Lissa L. Broome, John M. Conley & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Dangerous 
Categories: Narratives of Corporate Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 759, 788-89 
(2011). 
 80. Berman, supra note 71. 
 81. As one director put it, “When you think about [one of the company’s products] 
particularly and its relationship to women’s health and appearance, we needed . . . a 
woman who, a person who looks at women’s health and who has a marketing 
background.” Broome, Conley & Krawiec, supra note 79, at 783 (alteration in original). 
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Clark, realized this mismatch when creating a marketing strategy for 
feminine hygiene products. 82  The company’s campaign featured an 
advertisement portraying an un-relatable scenario to women. 83  Since 
then, Kimberly-Clark has started programs specifically targeted at 
improving female representation, and the numbers are evidence of its 
success.84 Women held 19% of director positions in 2009 and by 2013, 
that number had increased to 26%.85 
Many may blame the lack of women on corporate boards on 
“tradition” 86  and the stereotypical gender roles that view men as 
dominant and women as submissive. However, it is important to 
consider the full range of business implications involved. For instance, 
several beauty organizations are family-run businesses where 
connection with the owners may be given more credence than gender.87 
C. BARRIERS TO ACHIEVING DIVERSITY 
1. Low Representation of Women in Traditional Pipelines to Board 
Seats 
One of the contributing factors to the dearth of women on corporate 
boards is that new directors are overwhelmingly chosen based on prior 
CEO, CFO, director or senior management experience, which most 
women lack.88 There is a dominant perception that prior management or 
directorship experience is a necessary qualification for a director 
position.89 Data demonstrates that “[o]ver one-half of male Fortune 500 
board members in 2001 were CEOs or former CEOs.”90 A study done by 
Russell Reynolds Associates Inc. demonstrates that companies are 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Berman, supra note 71. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. Estee Lauder and L’Oréal are two such examples. 
 88. See supra Section I.A (discussing board member qualifications). 
 89. Corp. Guide, supra note 11, at 106; see also Bonnie Gwin, Trends in Board 
Composition over the Past Five Years, HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES BOARD MONITOR 
(2014), http://www.heidrick.com/~/media/Publications%20and%20Reports/Trends-in-b 
oard-composition-over-the-past-five-years.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7VN-XYCK]. 
 90. Lissa Lamkin Broome, The Corporate Boardroom: Still a Male Club, 33 J. 
CORP. L. 665, 670 (2008). 
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hesitant to break this pattern and pick fresh talent, and instead choose to 
focus on the “usual suspects.”91 
Since there is a premium placed on experience, boards are blinding 
themselves to a whole pool of candidates and instead narrowing the 
scope of selection to senior level candidates, which are 
disproportionately men.92 A study published in the Harvard Business 
Review found that 19% of male directors preferred to focus “solely on 
qualifications and experience” while disregarding gender in the selection 
process.93 This is evidenced by the fact that in 2014, women made up 
only 4% of CEOs of S&P 1500 companies, and Fortune 500 companies’ 
boards prioritized former or current CEO experience in the selection of 
new members. 94  Around 45% of female directors and 67% of male 
directors have been CFOs or CEOs of a company previously.95 Since 
women are often excluded from these roles in the first place, they are 
less likely to be considered for board positions. 
2. Women Fail to Live up to the Stereotypical Male Leader 
There is a mismatch between the dominant and authoritative 
behaviors associated with leadership and traditionally female qualities.96 
Stereotypical male leadership qualities are considered unattractive when 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Joann S. Lublin, This Is Why Corporate Boards Aren’t More Diverse, WALL 
ST. J. BLOG (Apr. 15, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/atwork/2014/04/15/this-is-why-corpo 
rate-boards-arent-more-diverse/ [http://perma.cc/X9NZ-E7LJ]. 
 92. Tamara S. Smallman, Note, The Glass Boardroom: The SEC’s Role in 
Cracking the Door Open so Women May Enter, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 801, 808 
(2013) (noting that “women hold only about a quarter of . . . senior level positions”). 
 93. Groysberg & Bell, supra note 48; see also Groden, supra note 69 (noting that 
female directors were more likely than male directors to acknowledge the importance of 
diversity on boards). 
 94. GAO Report, supra note 31, at 14 (noting that “current and former CEOs 
composed nearly half of new appointments to boards of Fortune 500 companies in 
2014”); see also Corp. Guide, supra note 11, at 49 (stating that the 2013 Spencer Stuart 
Board Index found that those who had previous leadership experience and had held 
senior positions in companies made up 23% of new appointees to boards in 2013, an 
increase from 16% in 2012.). 
 95. Lublin, supra note 91. 
 96. In interviews, many directors specifically mentioned the cliché that men are 
from Mars and women are from Venus. Broome, Conley & Krawiec, supra note 79, at 
780. 
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exhibited by women. Typically, “[t]he ideal leader, like the ideal man, is 
decisive, assertive, and independent. In contrast, women are expected to 
be nice, caretaking, and unselfish.”97 The same behaviors that make men 
seem confident and self-assured make women seem vain or impolite.98 
Compared to their male counterparts, “women who excel in traditionally 
male domains are viewed as competent but less likable.”99 On the other 
hand, when women are “conventionally feminine,” they gain in 
likability but lose out on respect, as they appear “too emotional to make 
tough decisions and too soft to be strong leaders.”100 This has come to be 
known as a “double bind,” in which women must choose between being 
viewed as likable but ineffective, or capable and unlikable.101 To ascend 
to executive positions, women are expected to behave like men: 
Young women today are urged to finish school, find a job, acquire 
skills, develop seniority, get tenure, make partner, work endless 
hours, and put children off until the very last minute. When and if 
they do give birth, they are expected to treat the event like an 
appendectomy, take a brief time out for recuperation and then 
resume the truly important business of business.102 
Because most directors are male, the director voting process is skewed 
towards choosing new members who adhere to a similar leadership 
                                                                                                                 
 97. Herminia Ibarra et al., Women Rising: The Unseen Barriers, HARV. BUS. REV., 
Sept. 2013, at 65. A Columbia Business School study showed the impact of gender on 
likability by capturing students’ opinions through a case study involving a venture 
capitalist. Students’ reactions differed based only on whether the venture capitalist was 
named “Howard” or “Heidi”: “Howard was described as likeable and Heidi was seen as 
selfish and ‘not the type of person you would want to hire or work for.’” How to Be a 
Workplace MVP, supra note 68. 
 98. See How to Be a Workplace MVP, supra note 68. 
 99. Id. One male director made this observation about a female director who was 
no longer at the company: “[s]he was exceedingly competent and assertive and asked a 
lot of questions and pressed a lot of issues and I think some people got uncomfortable. I 
don’t know whether they got uncomfortable with her because of the issues she was 
raising or because she was raising issues and was a woman . . . but she wasn’t around 
very long.” Broome, Conley & Krawiec, supra note 79, at 785. 
 100. Ibarra et al., supra note 97. 
 101. CATALYST, THE DOUBLE BIND DILEMMA FOR WOMEN IN LEADERSHIP: 
DAMNED IF YOU DO, DOOMED IF YOU DON’T (2007), http://www.catalyst.org/knowled 
ge/double-bind [https://perma.cc/RET5-9A8Z]. 
 102. ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD 29 (10th ed. 2002). 
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archetype. 103  In the GAO study, many stakeholders disclosed how 
boards of directors want to “maintain a certain level of comfort in the 
boardroom” by picking new directors who “fit in.”104 While half of the 
appointments are made based on executive recruiters’ efforts, there is a 
strong reliance on personal connections for the remainder of 
appointments.105 The director nomination process has traditionally been 
“insular,” and consequentially, a networking game.106 
 Sheryl Sandberg, the COO of Facebook, has said, “The gender 
stereotypes introduced in childhood are reinforced throughout our lives 
and become self-fulfilling prophecies. Most leadership positions are 
held by men, so women don’t expect to achieve them, and that becomes 
one of the reasons they don’t.”107 Social scientists call this phenomenon 
the “stereotype threat”: being aware of a negative stereotype makes it 
more likely for an individual in that group to be negatively affected by 
it. 108  The stereotype threat is a contributing factor in discouraging 
women from rising to executive ranks and from entering technical 
fields, such as computer science.109  Many, including Sandberg, have 
                                                                                                                 
 103. Id. at 31; Berman, supra note 71 (“Some will say that women often don’t fit the 
typical image of a leader, putting them at a disadvantage when it comes to decisions 
about promotions and pay. ‘Typically the prototype of the leader is a white male,’ said 
Ragins, the University of Wisconsin professor. ‘So when we think about who is going 
to be the next CEO of the company, the image that comes to mind is often that of a 
white heterosexual male.’”). 
 104. GAO Report, supra note 31, at 13; see also Broome, Conley & Krawiec, supra 
note 79, at 785 (“[An African-American male director of a national company] described 
his board colleagues—bluntly—as ‘all in these gated communities . . . comfortable 
talking with people who are just like they are.’ The night before the meeting ‘they go 
out to dinner with each other’ and do not invite him.”). 
 105. See GAO Report, supra note 31, at 13. 
 106. See RUSSELL REYNOLDS ASSOCIATES, DIFFERENT IS BETTER—WHY DIVERSITY 
MATTERS IN THE BOARDROOM 1 (2009), http://www.russellreynolds.com/insights/thoug 
ht-leadership/Documents/different-is-better_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9VL-UY7H]. 
 107. SANDBERG, supra note 1, at 22. 
 108. Stereotype Threat Widens Achievement Gap, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ASSOCIATION (July 15, 2006), http://www.apa.org/research/action/stereotype.aspx [https 
://perma.cc/9MPD-V9WY]. 
 109. CATHERINE HILL ET AL., WHY SO FEW? WOMEN IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, 
ENGINEERING AND MATHEMATICS (2010), http://www.aauw.org/files/2013/02/Why-So-
Few-Women-in-Science-Technology-Engineering-and-Mathematics.pdf [http://perma. 
cc/3446-E7B8]; see also supra Section I.B (discussing figures of women graduating 
with STEM degrees). 
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pointed to the fact that women are troubled with self-doubt more often 
than men, which hinders their success.110 
3. Inflexibility of the Workplace to Meet the Demands of Motherhood 
The workplace is simply out of sync with family life.111 Family and 
work priorities clash fiercely, and the United States lags behind other 
nations when it comes to arranging flexible work opportunities for 
women.112  During the same years that women’s careers demand the 
greatest time investment, their biological clocks tick with the pressure to 
have children. 113  Although women are getting married and having 
children at a later age, they still have an internal biological clock 
dictating the ideal time to have children, should they choose to do so.114 
                                                                                                                 
 110. See generally SANDBERG, supra note 1. Warren Buffett, in an interview with 
The Levo, has stated, 
I’ve seen very, very bright women. I use the example of Katherine 
Graham, who was outstanding. While she was CEO of the 
Washington Post the stock went up 40 for 1, she won a Pulitzer 
Prize, but she had been told by her mother, she’d been told by her 
husband, she’d been told by lots of people that women weren’t as 
good as men in business. It was nonsense. I kept telling her, “Quit 
looking in that fun house mirror. You know, here’s a real mirror. 
You’re something.” And as smart as she was, as high grade as she 
was, you know, as famous as she became, right to her dying day she 
had that little voice inside her that kept repeating what her mother 
told her a long time ago. 
Caroline Wright, Warren Buffett’s Advice to YoPro Millennial Women, YAHOO! FIN. 
(May 9, 2013), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/warren-buffett-advice-yopro-millennial-
124938241.html [http://perma.cc/6Z37-BDRT]. 
 111. See, e.g., CRITTENDEN, supra note 102, at 30-32. See generally JULIA 
WARTENBERG, THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE WORK-LIFE CONFLICT IN THE UNITED STATES 
(2011), https://www.coc.org/files/Briefing%20Paper%207%20Work%20Life%20Confl 
ict.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8P2-D95Q]; JOAN C. WILLIAMS & HEATHER BOUSHEY, THE 
THREE FACES OF WORK-FAMILY CONFLICT (2010), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/w 
p-content/uploads/issues/2010/01/pdf/threefaces.pdf [https://perma.cc/MK42-UUFY]. 
 112. CRITTENDEN, supra note 102, at 36. 
 113. See id. at 30-31. 
 114. Technically, the “optimal” age to have children according to John Mirowsky, 
sociologist at University of Texas, is between 21.8 and 39.5 years. See generally John 
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Women who choose to have children face the challenge of balancing 
their home and work lives. Since partners do not typically share equally 
in the housework and child rearing, women are essentially left with two 
full-time jobs, and the workplace has not evolved to give women with 
children the flexibility they need to fulfill their responsibilities. The 
government is an apt illustration of an establishment that strengthens the 
traditional gendered division of labor, as evidenced by its imbalanced 
offering of civil and fiscal protections to the sexes.115 This traditional 
concept is also evident in the educational realm; the fact that school days 
end in the middle of the afternoon and have summer breaks is based on 
the presumption that the caretaker does not have a full-time job and can 
take care of the children.116 
The impediments women face in their climb to higher ranks 
concerns Felice N. Schwartz, the founder and president of Catalyst.117 
She argues that “women are different from men—they have babies—
and because of biology, tradition, and socialization, many might want to 
reduce their work pace for a time to raise their children. This made 
women more expensive to hire than men . . . because some will need 
flexibility and a temporarily slower career path.” 118  Offering this 
flexibility, however, works to the employer’s advantage because there is 
a greater sacrifice in losing capable women than there is in 
accommodating them.119 
Despite setbacks in the workplace today, women have come a long 
way from where they started. The first group of women to receive 
higher education graduated in the early 1900s.120 At first, these women 
had to choose between their career and their families and if they wanted 
                                                                                                                 
Mirowsky, Parenthood and Health: The Pivotal and Optimal Age at First Birth, 81 
SOC. FORCES 315, 341 (2002). 
 115. CRITTENDEN, supra note 102, at 6. 
 116. Rebecca Traister, The Single American Woman, N.Y. MAG. (Feb. 22, 2016), 
http://nymag.com/thecut/2016/02/political-power-single-women-c-v-r.html [https://per 
ma.cc/8JAU-ZT9W]. 
 117. CRITTENDEN, supra note 102, at 30-33. 
 118. Id. at 30-31. 
 119. Id. at 31 (“She assumed that only women might want a non-career dominant 
period in their lives and that only mothers are more costlier to hire, overlooking the 
factors, including excessive competitiveness, that make some men expensive 
propositions as well.”). 
 120. Id. at 33. 
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a career, they had to completely abandon their home lives.121 Later, even 
if women went to work, it was either before or after they had children, 
and their options were limited to teaching, nursing or secretarial work—
the few fields open to women.122 The college-educated baby boomers 
were the next group of female graduates and the first women to try to 
have both a family and a career.123 These women chased their career 
aspirations and deferred having children for as long as they could.124 
Female graduates today are the first to start their careers “at near 
parity with men,”125 yet they recognize that receiving similar prospects 
                                                                                                                 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. Warren Buffett, in an interview with the Levo League, stated, 
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were women. 
Society just said if you want to be a teacher, fine. If you want to be a 
nurse, fine. If you want to be a secretary, fine. But forget everything 
else. So, I have seen that change in my lifetime, although change 
was slow…It has changed a lot for the better. There’s still important 
ways to go. 
Wright, supra note 110. 
 123. CRITTENDEN, supra note 102, at 33. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See On Pay Gap, Millennial Women Near Parity–For Now, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/12/11/on-pay-gap-millennial-wo 
men-near-parity-for-now/ [https://perma.cc/R66R-PSET] [hereinafter Pew Study] 
(stating that the millennial generation of young women are “better educated than their 
mothers and grandmothers had been . . . [b]ut when they look ahead they see 
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as men does not level the playing field in terms of their professional 
success.126 Women spend a great deal of time and money preparing for 
careers despite the uncertainty surrounding their professional aspirations 
once they have children.127 They are aware of the reality that mothers are 
often at a disadvantage,128 and are more inclined to find that men are 
favored in society,129 and that not enough has been done to advance 
workplace equality.130 Women’s sidelining in their professions is often 
excused as “something women ‘choose’ or as part of life’s inevitable 
compromises.”131 
Part of the problem in the workplace is the fact that raising children 
in America is hardly measured as work.132 In the modern economy, two-
thirds of all wealth is created by human skills and creativity, which 
means that parents who are rearing children are major wealth producers 
in our economy.133 Ann Crittenden, author of The Price of Motherhood, 
has stated that since individual skills are the necessary source of 
financial growth, caregivers have “the most important job in the world” 
as it is their job to nurture those skills from a young age.134 However, 
economists consider the time required to raise children135 as “periods of 
non-participation in the workforce,” during which an individual’s 
professional skills and economic usefulness decrease in value.136 
                                                                                                                 
roadblocks to their success . . . [and] think it’s easier for men to get top executive jobs 
than it is for women”). 
 126. SANDBERG, supra note 1, at 15. 
 127. CRITTENDEN, supra note 102, at 35. 
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Interestingly, only 30% of working mothers said motherhood has actually negatively 
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their work hours. Jenna Goudreau, ForbesWoman and TheBump.com Survey Results, 
FORBES (Mar. 2, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/2010/03/01/family-career-working-
mother-forbes-woman-time-survey.html [https://perma.cc/JSW3-SYRM]. 
 129. 53% of women vs 36% of men. Pew Study, supra note 125. 
 130. 72% of women vs 61% of men. Id. 
 131. See CRITTENDEN, supra note 102, at 44. 
 132. Id. at. 11. 
 133. Id. at 8 (“Unpaid female caregiving is not only the life blood of families, it is 
the very heart of the economy.”). 
 134. Id. at 11. 
 135. Id. at 4. 
 136. Crittenden notes that “the only things that atrophy when a woman has children 
are her income and her leisure.” Id. 
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Individuals who undertake the role of nurturer are discouraged and 
even punished for performing the job that is critical to human 
advancement. This creates a contradiction wherein the importance of 
family and raising children is emphasized, but the work it takes to make 
a family is overlooked.137 Parents who choose to spend any meaningful 
amount of time with their children suffer a substantial economic cost.138 
In reality, one parent has to sacrifice advancing his or her career to take 
care of the children, and it is typically the mother.139 Women fall behind 
men in their career paths as they are often forced to scale back and drop 
out of the workforce or lose networking prospects and other 
opportunities 140 : “[u]nfortunately, women’s efforts to manage the 
incongruity between organizational practice and their multiple roles is 
seen as evidence that they are not serious about their careers and not that 
organizations have failed to adapt to their needs.” 141  As a result, 
organizations and mentors focus their efforts on men, who are perceived 
as more secure investments.142 
Stay-at-home mothers make it possible for their male spouses to 
advance in their careers and attain senior positions in the workplace. 
According to a Harvard Business School study, only 10% of women 
have a partner who does not work full-time compared to 60% of men.143 
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Development, 3 J. CHANGE MGMT 294 (2003)). 
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HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2014, at 65. Another study found that over half (55%) of male 
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A Pew Research survey found that 51% of mothers with young children 
(under the age of eighteen) compared to only 16% of fathers opined that 
working and parenting has made career advancement more difficult for 
them.144 
Women in the workforce are not necessarily employed in the 
professions or at the salaries commensurate with their education and 
training.145 A Harvard Business School study in 2014 found that even 
the most highly educated married women were not meeting their 
economic or professional goals.146 Even though they had comparable 
ambition and education as their male spouses, they prioritized their 
husbands’ careers.147 The overwhelming consensus among Generation X 
Harvard Business School graduates is that men expect their own careers 
to take the utmost priority while women find that their spouses’ careers 
often take precedence over their own.148  
Recently, stay-at-home fathers have helped their female spouses 
advance in their careers. In many instances where women have achieved 
high ranks in a corporation, their husbands have sacrificed their own 
careers to care for the children. Leslie Blodgett, founder of the global 
cosmetic empire Bare Essentials, stated that “[t]o make it to the top, you 
need a wife.”149 Carly Fiorina’s husband retired early from AT&T when 
                                                                                                                 
executives who are married have partners who stay at home, while only 12% of married 
female business leaders have comparable support from their partners. Caroline 
Fairchild, The Rise of Stay at Home Dads? For Female Execs, Not So Much, FORTUNE: 
MOST POWERFUL WOMEN (Nov. 20, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/11/20/stay-at-
home-dads-female-execs/ [https://perma.cc/VWX8-JQX9]. 
 144. Pew Study, supra note 125. 
 145. CRITTENDEN, supra note 102, at 28. 
 146. Robin J. Ely, Pamela Stone & Colleen Ammerman, Rethink What You Know 
About High Achieving Women, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2014, at 101, https://hbr.org/201 
4/12/rethink-what-you-know-about-high-achieving-women [http://perma.cc/MLB3-ZA 
JM]. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. When an executive told Dawn Lepore, the CEO of Drugstore.com from 2004 
until its sale to Walgreens, that her job was made easy due to her husband’s willingness 
to stay at home, she remarked, “[N]o, not easy. He makes it possible.” Carol Hymowitz, 
Behind Every Great Woman, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, (Jan. 5, 2012, 3:53 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-01-04/behind-every-great-woman [http: 
//perma.cc/KX3K-8PFJ]. 
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she was appointed Hewlett-Packard’s CEO. 150  Similarly, numerous 
female executives of other Fortune 500 companies, including Xerox’s 
Ursula Burns, PepsiCo’s Indra Nooyi, WellPoint’s Angela Braly, and 
IBM’s Ginni Rometty, had husbands who scaled back their careers.151 
At Fortune’s Most Powerful Women Summit in 2002, 30% of the 187 
participants had stay-at-home spouses.152 While stay-at-home fathers are 
no longer unusual, they are not the norm either.153 The facts indicate that 
it is difficult for a parent to rise through the ranks to chief executive 
without having a stay-at-home spouse or outsourcing childcare.154 
4. Not All Mentoring Is Created Equal 
While men advance through mentoring and sponsorship, women do 
not receive such opportunities in the same capacity.155 Mentorship is the 
process by which individuals receive feedback and advice from more 
knowledgeable colleagues, and sponsorship is when the mentor draws 
on his or her connections with senior managers to promote the 
mentee.156 Though similar, sponsorship is indispensable to rising in the 
ranks of one’s career.157 Without sponsorship, it is less probable that 
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didn_t_get/transcript?language=en [http://perma.cc/228N-ELYX]. 
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women will seek out or be selected for leading roles.158 Surveys and 
interviews conducted by the Harvard Business Review have suggested 
that women who are skilled and ambitious are “overmentored and 
undersponsored.”159 Men have an easier time obtaining sponsors who 
will encourage their advancement. 160  Even when women do find 
mentors, the advancement opportunities that these relationships lead to 
are fewer than those acquired by men through their mentors.161 Women 
are also typically mentored by junior staff, which slows their rate of 
advancement.162 
Unexamined mindsets about how men and women interact in the 
workforce impacts the advice women are given from mentors and 
sponsors on their way to the top. Mentors struggle to determine what 
type of advice is useful for women in a landscape that favors masculine 
characteristics. As one participant from a Harvard study explains, 
“[E]ven well-intended mentors have trouble helping women navigate the 
fine line between being ‘not aggressive enough’ or ‘lacking in presence’ 
and being ‘too aggressive’ or ‘too controlling.’”163 On the one hand, men 
have mentors who have helped them come to power in new positions, 
strategize prospective moves, and have publicly supported their 
authority.164 Contrastingly, women’s narratives reveal “how mentoring 
relationships have helped them understand themselves, their preferred 
styles of operating, and ways they might need to change as they move 
up the leadership pipeline.”165 
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18, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/women-and-ambition-a-corporate-story-20 
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 159. See Ibarra et al., supra note 97. 
 160. See Caprino, supra note 157. 
 161. See Ibarra et al., supra note 97. 
 162. See id. 
 163. See id. To illustrate this point, consider a male executive who proudly 
mentored both a man and a woman. Commenting on his role, he said, “I helped the 
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 164. See Ibarra et al., supra note 97. 
 165. See id. 
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After a couple of years in the workforce, men’s assurances and 
desires remain unchanged, while women’s sink radically.166 By the mid-
point of their careers, women do not feel that their superiors support 
their ambitions, while men feel otherwise. 167  Once women receive 
feedback indicating that they do not seem to possess the desired 
characteristics for promotion, they tone down their aspirations. 168  A 
survey published in the Harvard Business Review also discovered a lack 
of recognition on the part of male directors regarding the biases faced by 
female directors.169 While the women felt like outsiders, the men were 
unaware that women felt this way.170 The fact that men and women 
generally have different interests may contribute to women’s symptoms 
of alienation.171 
The ability to understand a business in its entirety is crucial to 
corporate governance, but there is a disconnect between the advice 
women get from their mentors and the skills that are truly necessary to 
become a corporate leader.172 Susan Colantuono, the CEO of Leading 
Women, explained in her TED talk that leadership could be divided into 
three categories: “personal greatness,” “engaging the greatness in 
others,” and “business, strategic, and financial acumen.”173 These three 
components are not weighted evenly when it comes to rising in a 
company. 174  Business, strategic, and financial acumen is twice as 
important when identifying employees with potential.175 
To advance from entry-level positions to middle management, 
women are told to exemplify qualities of personal greatness (by proving 
themselves to be sharp, diligent, honest, and loyal individuals), and also 
engage the greatness of others (interact with customers, embolden their 
                                                                                                                 
 166. See Ferro, supra note 158. 
 167. See Julie Coffman & Bill Neuenfeldt, Everyday Moments of Truth: Frontline 
Managers Are Key to Women’s Career Aspirations, BAIN & CO. (June 17, 2014), 
http://www.bain.com/publications/articles/everyday-moments-of-truth.aspx [http://perm 
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co-workers, negotiate successfully, handle conflicts, and communicate 
effectively). 176  However, the above guidance lacks any mention of 
business, strategic, and financial acumen, which is necessary to advance 
from middle management positions to higher levels of governance. 
5. Identified Patterns 
Even when women serve on boards, their power is often minimal 
and certain patterns have been identified, including a lack of critical 
mass, the groupthink phenomenon, and the trophy woman phenomenon. 
The theory of critical mass was applied to gender diversity in 
boardrooms for the first time in 2006 when researchers demonstrated 
that having three or more women in the boardroom could lead to crucial 
changes in the workplace.177 As the percentage of women in a group 
increases, women can form alliances, increase their visibility, and have a 
greater impact on board discussions. 178  Debra Walton, chief content 
officer of Thomson Reuters has acknowledged this as the “‘Power of 
Three’: One woman is a token, two are a presence and three are a 
voice.”179 When there is less than a critical mass of women, it reduces 
women’s effectiveness as leaders because their power is often reduced 
by the “solo woman phenomenon” or “tokenism,” whereby a single 
member of a minority group is treated as a token and is on the receiving 
end of excessive criticism and scrutiny.180 Women in fewer numbers on 
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boards must deal with visibility, polarization, and assimilation issues, 
and are scrutinized more closely while frequently feeling isolated.181 
Groupthink is the “psychological behavior of minimising conflicts 
and reaching a consensus decision without critically evaluating 
alternative ideas in a cohesive in-group environment.”182 It involves self-
deception and is motivated by the pressure to conform to group attitudes 
and mores.183 Groupthink is particularly harmful in boards because it 
compromises the individual members’ ability to voice differing 
opinions, instead creating a pressurized environment wherein directors 
are reluctant to defy the norm.184 
Even when women are appointed to boards, statistics show that 
their numbers may be inflated due to the trophy phenomenon, under 
which the same “token” or “trophy” woman is appointed to multiple 
boards. In the U.S., it is not uncommon to find one woman serving on 
multiple boards, even up to seven boards at a time.185 This distorts the 
statistics, and thus, the true number of distinct women directors must be 
smaller than that indicated by Catalyst’s 19.9% figure.186 These “token” 
appointments give the appearance that companies care about gender 
diversity when in reality they have not made it a priority.187 
Critics worry that boards with these trophy directors are 
overextended and therefore unable to deliver appropriate company 
supervision.188 It is important to note that women are predominantly 
associated with trophy director status, while many men are involved 
                                                                                                                 
Meaningful Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards, 11 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 337, 
351 (2012). 
 181. Carlson, supra note 180, at 351. 
 182. Eric YW Leung, Diversifying the Board–A Step Towards Better Governance, 
ACAA GLOBAL (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.accaglobal.com/in/en/student/exam-
support-resources/professional-exams-study-resources/p1/technical-articles/diversifying 
-the-board—a-step-towards-better-governance.html [https://perma.cc/KA2L-CUHW]. 
 183. See James McRitchie, Groupthink in the Boardroom Context, CORP. 
GOVERNANCE (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.corpgov.net/2015/02/groupthink-boardroom-
context/ [http://perma.cc/YS3E-3S77]. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards: 
How Much Difference Does Difference Make?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 379 (2014). 
 186. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 187. GAO Report, supra note 31, at 14. 
 188. Rhode & Packel, supra note 185, at 382. 
234 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
with only one or two boards.189 The number of female trophy directors 
has grown exponentially, increasing from nineteen in 2001 to eighty in 
2006.190 Governance consultant Bonnie Hill is one such example.191 She 
commented on how companies “‘like to bring on people who have a 
track record’ [of serving] on other boards.”192 She herself has eleven 
years of experience holding directorships at Home Depot Inc. and Yum 
Brand Inc. and has been frequently requested to join an additional 
Fortune 250 company’s board.193 
Moreover, when boards already have one or two women on board, 
their appointment of another woman is less likely.194 The phenomenon 
was noticeable across small, medium, and large corporations in 2014 
with respect to women’s board appointments.195 Of companies that had 
no women on their boards, 29% added one woman; of companies that 
had one female, 15% added an additional; and of companies that had 
two females on their boards, only 6% added another female.196 This has 
prevented women from achieving the “critical mass” necessary to 
influence corporate decisions. 
6. Some Boards Do Not Find a Lack of Diversity Problematic 
Recent studies show that America’s business elite deem the current 
board makeup acceptable and do not view the lack of gender diversity as 
a particularly urgent issue. 197  A 2015 study by LeanIn.org and 
McKinsey & Company noted corporations’ somewhat hypocritical 
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treatment of the issue of gender diversity in the boardroom, which is an 
unfortunate situation, given that “the road to equal representation in 
corporate America lacks backing from those in the best position to build 
it.” 198  According to PricewaterhouseCoopers’ (“PwC”) 2016 Annual 
Corporate Directors Survey of 884 public company directors, 41% of 
male directors labeled gender diversity as a “very important” attribute 
for their companies’ boards, compared to 37% two years ago.199 Most 
women said diversity in the boardroom benefits the corporation, while 
most men did not agree.200 
The fact that existing boards fail to find diversity important is tied 
to the lack of women in these positions. Boards made up mostly of men 
may also be less welcoming to new members, while those with female 
members are more likely to add new members.201 This is significant 
because newer members of boards are more likely to view diversity as a 
positive attribute.202 While some organizations have instituted a policy 
to promote diversity, nearly a third of the 1322 CEOs in a 2014 PwC 
survey had not.203 Roughly 64% of CEOs declared that their companies 
maintain a diversity and inclusiveness strategy, 13% stated that their 
companies did not have such a policy but did plan to implement one, 
while 17% of CEOs’ companies did not have such a strategy in place 
nor did they plan on enacting one.204 
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D. THE CASE FOR DIVERSITY 
The case for diversity can be categorized as either an economic or 
ethical argument. The economic argument, known as the business case 
for diversity, holds that boardroom diversity enhances a company’s 
bottom line financial performance. 205  On the other hand, the ethical 
argument calls for equal opportunity and inclusiveness.206 
1. Business Case 
The business case for diversity argues that diversity leads to better 
economic outcomes. 207  Studies have shown that corporations with 
diverse boards enjoy greater profits, as diversity “leads to better 
decision-making, improved performance of monitoring functions, and 
stronger market penetration.” 208  Studies have also shown that 
corporations with female board members realize greater benefits in 
terms of stock value, equity yield, and growth compared to companies 
where women were nonexistent on boards.209 Dr. Aaron Dhir, author 
of Challenging Boardroom Homogeneity: Corporate Law, Governance, 
and Diversity, has identified several positive outcomes when three or 
more women are present on boards: 
(1) Enhanced dialogue 
(2) Better decision-making, including the value of dissent 
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 207. Id at 341. 
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(3) More effective risk mitigation and crisis management, and a 
better balance between risk-welcoming and risk-aversion behavior 
(4) Higher quality monitoring of and guidance to management 
(5) Positive changes to the boardroom environment and culture 
(6) More orderly and systematic board work 
(7) Positive changes in the behavior of men.210 
Thus, the benefits of board diversity translate directly to improved 
corporate performance. 
For companies to succeed, their boards should have market 
reciprocity, i.e., they should be a reflection of their customer base.211 
Women account for well over 70% of the purchasing power in the 
household and $20 trillion of global purchases.212 Currently, only 16% 
of directors have the impression that their boards grasp the 
undercurrents of the industries in which their corporations operate.213 If 
the percentage of female directors were more proportionate to the 
percentage of female employees and the female customer base, 
companies would develop a better understanding of the marketplace, 
which could increase corporate profits. 214  Therefore, obtaining the 
female perspective is consistent with directors’ fiduciary duties to 
enhance the companies’ value for their shareholders. 
Investors have also expressed concern over boardrooms satiated 
with directors who have been around for a long time, as their ties to the 
company may make them less disposed to defy senior directors. 215 
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Having a diverse board could improve a firm’s investor relations, as 
directors can strengthen ties with investors by making decisions that 
keep them satisfied with how the company is being run.216 Boards are 
now paying more attention to investor recommendations.217 As PwC’s 
Annual Corporate Directors Survey found, “[i]n some ways, the 
pendulum has swung from a ‘board-centric’ model that took root after 
the governance and accounting scandals of the 1990s to an ‘investor-
centric’ model today.”218 
The business case for having more women on boards has its 
limitations, as the research does not explain exactly how board 
heterogeneity may change the corporate setting. 219  Specifically, it is 
difficult to decipher whether companies with better financial 
performance have the capacity to add women to their boards, or if 
women choose to work for more successful companies, or if women 
positively influence a company’s performance.220 Furthermore, it can be 
challenging to distinctively identify an individual director’s impact on 
company performance.221 
2. Moral Argument 
Morally, diversity on corporate boards is important since it 
demonstrates an equal opportunity for both men and women.222 This 
                                                                                                                 
by itself does not ensure that directors will act in the stakeholders’ interests. Francis & 
Lublin, supra note 34. 
 216. See Leung, supra note 182. 
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argument is premised on societal motivations including equal 
opportunity and acknowledging the disproportionate obstacles that 
select groups confront.223 As law professor Barbara Black has stated: 
Given the poor performance of the boards of many leading financial 
institutions during the recent financial crisis, it is hard to believe that 
the presence of more women in the boardroom would have a 
deleterious effect on risk-management oversight . . . . [A] business 
justification for increased female representation on corporate boards 
hardly seems necessary . . . . This is an issue of equal opportunity.224 
Despite the appeal of this argument, it has limited value within the 
shareholder primacy model of the corporate structure. 225  It can be 
challenging to implement a diversity policy within a corporation if it has 
not been sufficiently proven that board diversity positively impacts 
corporate performance.226 
Lissa Broome, head of University of North Carolina School of 
Law’s Director Diversity Initiative, and Kimberly Krawiec, Katherine 
Robinson Everett Professor of Law at Duke University, noted how a 
diverse corporate board sends a signal to relevant observers of corporate 
behavior. 227  Signaling is one party conveying to another party 
information about itself that is important but not immediately 
apparent. 228  Having a diverse board may enhance the corporate 
reputation by signaling to shareholders and employees that the company 
values gender diversity.229 
Lisa M. Fairfax, co-director of the DirectWomen Board Institute 
dedicated to promoting board diversity, believes that corporate boards 
today will progressively react to shareholders’ concerns because of the 
moral argument without needing to defend their actions through market 
gain alone. 230  Fairfax compared promoting boardroom diversity to 
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corporate charitable donations.231 Boards’ decisions to make charitable 
contributions have been upheld by the courts as such acts promote the 
corporation’s perception in society.232 Endorsing gender heterogeneity in 
boardrooms for the company’s benefit may likewise boost the 
corporation’s reputation.233 
Board diversity combines alternate and complementary opinions, 
experiences, and views for a deeper and more constructive dialogue.234 
Combining different individuals’ contributions will likely lead to higher 
quality decisions based on a broad range of perspectives than decisions 
made in a groupthink environment.235 By enabling a varied blend of 
perspectives, diversity fosters the development of new products and 
solutions.236 
Despite the drawbacks typically associated with stereotypical 
gender differences, the differences in personality may actually benefit 
certain human relations issues.237 As one male director stated, “[W]omen 
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are a lot better [at] dealing with egos of other people than men are and 
they’re a lot more patient and they’re a lot more team oriented,” while 
men are more “competitive and . . . blustery.”238 Increasing women’s 
presence in executive roles will also allow for better role models for 
other women in the workplace.239  Successful women help accelerate 
progress toward gender equality as other women’s achievements help 
motivate women in more junior positions.240 
II. RECENT EFFORTS TO IMPROVE DIVERSITY 
A. STATE LAW INITIATIVES 
There are no significant gender diversity obligations imposed by 
corporate law at the state level. Delaware law, for instance, has no 
stipulations regarding diversity of board candidates.241 There have been 
some state level initiatives of a more voluntary nature, designed to 
encourage women’s representation on boards. 242  Several states, 
including Massachusetts, Illinois, and California, have recently passed 
resolutions recommending the appointment of women to boards and 
setting the minimum number of board positions that must be occupied 
by women, depending on the board size.243 For example, the Illinois 
resolution sets guidelines for the number of women that public 
corporations should appoint by 2018: boards with fewer than five 
members should aim to have at least one woman; boards with five to 
nine members should have at least two women; and boards with nine or 
                                                                                                                 
Caprino, supra note 157 (quoting LOUANN BRIZENDINE, THE FEMALE BRAIN 5-8 
(2007)). 
 238. Broome, Conley & Krawiec, supra note 79, at 780. 
 239. A veteran female board member stressed that when she was an employee, the 
existence of female board members was assuring and gave her a sense of comfort. Id. at 
793. 
 240. Id. at 762 (noting that some directors were of the opinion that “diverse boards 
aid in the recruitment, retention, and promotion of women and minorities, particularly 
with succession issues in senior management”). 
 241. Remus Valsan, US Bill on Gender Diversity in the Boardroom, ECCLBLOG 
(Apr. 22, 2016), http://www.ecclblog.law.ed.ac.uk/2016/04/22/us-bill-on-gender-diversi 
ty-in-the-boardroom/ [https://perma.cc/GC8T-A267]. 
 242. Katz & McIntosh, supra note 28. 
 243. Id. 
242 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
more members should have at least three women. 244  Illinois state 
representative Michelle Mussman has stated, “As our work force 
becomes more representative of our society, it is very important that 
corporate leadership follows the same trend.”245 Other states, including 
Pennsylvania, 246  New York, 247  and Virginia 248  have also joined this 
movement. New York Representative Carolyn Maloney introduced the 
Gender Diversity in Corporate Leadership Act in March 2016, which the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce endorsed.249 This requires the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to release a yearly report on the 
gender diversity of boards, and further mandates that public companies 
recount the gender of board members and board candidates in the same 
fashion that they disclose name, age, and credentials.250 It further calls 
for the establishment of an SEC Advisory Group to describe approaches 
and make suggestions for ways companies can grow the female presence 
on their boards.251 
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B. FEDERAL LAW 
1. SEC Disclosure Law 
Prior to 2010, there was a notable absence of laws and regulations 
that addressed gender diversity.252 Given the absence of state and federal 
action on this issue, the SEC took initiative to address the lack of 
women on boards.253 Through a release in 2009, the SEC sought input 
from investors and other market participants about diversity in the 
boardroom.254 In response to its proposal, the SEC was flooded with 
letters, 90% of which endorsed company disclosure relating to 
boardroom diversity.255 Given that these letters came from individuals 
and organizations that represent over $3 trillion in resources, there is a 
prevailing sentiment that evidence of diversity is a crucial factor for 
company valuation.256 
Keeping in mind the public interest and the needs of investors, the 
SEC adopted a rule that added a disclosure component to the nomination 
process.257 The rule was a part of Regulation S-K, which is a set of rules 
developed by the SEC that sets forth detailed disclosure requirements 
for various SEC filings used by public companies. 258  Specifically, 
companies must now disclose whether they consider diversity in the 
nomination process, how diversity is considered, and how effective they 
deem their policy.259 These Proxy Disclosure Enhancements went into 
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effect on February 28, 2010260 and “provide investors with important 
information about companies’ financial condition and business practices 
for making informed investment and voting decisions.”261 
Although the disclosure rule is a step in the right direction, many 
have questioned the rule’s efficacy. Former Chair of the SEC, Mary Jo 
White, has said that many investors want to learn about the gender 
diversity of boards and it is debatable whether existing laws are truly 
providing the requisite information to them.262 
The primary concern with the law is its inconsistent interpretation. 
This stems from the SEC’s failure to define diversity, and its decision to 
instead allow companies to define it “in ways that they consider 
appropriate.” 263  Since diversity encompasses different things, a wide 
range of factors could fall under the umbrella of diversity. 264  A 
candidate may be considered diverse based on educational background, 
interests, professional experiences, individual qualities, differences in 
viewpoint, or based on age, race, gender, and ethnicity.265 In fact, an 
analysis of the proxy statements of the S&P 100 companies found that 
when interpreting diversity, most companies “define diversity with 
reference to a director’s prior experience or other nonidentity-based 
factors rather than his or her socio-demographic characteristics.” 266 
More than 80% of the companies considered background and experience 
as sources of diversity, while only about half defined diversity in terms 
of gender, race, and ethnicity. 267  In a recent petition to the SEC to 
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improve board nominee disclosure, a group of public fund fiduciaries 
supervising $1 trillion worth of assets stated that the lack of guidance on 
how diversity is defined and companies’ varying interpretations of the 
term fail to capture any information in a manner that would be relevant 
to investors.268 
The rule does not require companies to disclose diversity statistics 
and its vagueness allows companies to share very little.269 Companies 
can consider diversity in any way that suits them, and they are free to 
exclude gender altogether from this calculation.270 Companies can even 
report that they do not have a diversity policy and still be in compliance 
with the law.271 As a result of diversity’s ambiguous definition and the 
fact that the rule is more suggestive than compulsory, the envisioned 
change has yet to take effect despite the SEC’s efforts. 
2. Dodd-Frank Act 
Congress has emphasized the fact that financial regulators should 
be spearheading efforts to recruit employees from divergent 
backgrounds.272 Specifically, there is a clear instruction in Section 342 
of the Dodd-Frank Act for the SEC to launch an Office of Minority and 
Women Inclusion (“OMWI”) that would handle “all matters of the 
agency relating to diversity in management, employment, and business 
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activities.” 273  This law permits the SEC to take action to increase 
diversity in the workforce. The statute permits the OMWI to create 
standards for “assessing diversity policies and practices of regulated 
entities,” “increased participation of minority-owned and women-owned 
businesses in programs and contracts of the agency,” and “equal 
employment opportunity and racial, gender, and ethnic diversity of 
workforce and senior management.” 274  Even though OMWI’s new 
employs are marginally more diverse than preceding hires, the 2012 to 
2015 data exposes the persistent lack of diversity in the workplace.275 
C. OTHER U.S. EFFORTS 
To increase visibility of qualified candidates, organizations have 
created databases of qualified women ready to be appointed on company 
boards. Global Board Ready Women is one of the most prominent 
initiatives, and other projects include Diversity in Boardrooms, Stanford 
Women on Board Initiative, and WomenCorporateDirectors 
Foundation. 276  Organizations such as 2020 Women on Boards and 
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Diversity Inc. publish diversity indexes, 277  while other organizations 
have created diversity awards to encourage board diversity.278 
In recent years, investors have initiated their own efforts to improve 
gender diversity. 279  Investors have zeroed in on corporations’ 
environmental, social, and governance practices (“ESG”) as “corporate 
investment in ESG enhances a company’s performance and reputation, 
fosters revenue growth, and represents an avenue for shareholder 
engagement.” 280  Since gender diversity plays a crucial part in ESG 
practices, investors have begun to prioritize it accordingly. 281  One 
example of such efforts is the Thirty Percent Coalition founded in 2011, 
which aims to have women represent 30% of U.S. public companies’ 
boards.282 As a result of its efforts, a female director has been elected at 
over 100 companies that were previously governed by all-male 
boards.283 Another investor-led effort is State Street Global Advisors, 
which manages an exchange-traded fund that invests in U.S. companies 
with the highest levels of gender diversity in their sectors.284 
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D. GLOBAL APPROACH 
Countries around the world have taken measures to address gender 
diversity in corporate boardrooms. Some have taken a strong approach 
by enforcing mandatory quotas. Norway requires at least 40% of board 
seats to be allocated for women depending on the size of the board, Italy 
has a 33% quota, Malaysia instituted a 30% quota for new 
appointments, and Israel and India require at least one woman on the 
board. 285  Other countries have taken more voluntary approaches, 
including setting goals for women’s representation, which typically fall 
between 20% and 40%.286  
III. WAYS TO INCREASE WOMEN ON BOARDS 
Women’s low representation on boards is a multifaceted problem 
that requires a multifaceted solution. In addition to supporting initiatives 
already underway, board diversity could be encouraged through proxy 
access and amendments of disclosure laws. Furthermore, women should 
be encouraged to be proactive about their careers, but companies should 
still play their part to enable women’s success. 
A. SHAREHOLDER PROXY ACCESS RULES 
Shareholder voting allows shareholders to remedy mistakes by the 
board of directors through the nomination and election of new 
candidates for the board. However, direct shareholder voting in the 
context of the modern corporation would be complex and inefficient due 
to the number of shareholders and geographically dispersed ownership. 
The proxy process, whereby shareholders sign a proxy card, which 
authorizes an aggregating intermediary to vote the stakeholders’ shares 
in favor of a particular director (or for some other corporate action), is a 
way to simplify the process. Proxy access, i.e., the ability of 
shareholders to include director nominees in the company’s proxy 
material, is a way for shareholders to nominate or recommend specific 
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candidates for directorship roles.287 The proxy process, in essence, is one 
of the primary ways by which shareholders are able to participate in 
corporate governance and company meetings without a physical 
presence.288 
The proxy process, however, has had the opposite effect of its 
intended purpose as, in practice, it weakens shareholders’ ability to 
nominate and elect directors by rendering it increasingly more difficult 
to unseat incumbent directors.289 Although in theory shareholders have 
the right to nominate directors, their approval is mostly seen as a 
“rubber stamp process of affirmation,” given the tremendous costs and 
administrative burdens associated with the initiation of a challenge 
through proxy.290 
The SEC’s Rule 14a-8 is the mechanism that protects shareholders’ 
rights to vote in director elections by allowing their proposal to be 
placed beside management’s proposals in the proxy materials of a 
corporation. 291  While the rule used to permit the exclusion of 
shareholders’ director proposals, the SEC amended the rule in 2012; a 
company can no longer exclude a proposal purely because it relates to 
the nomination or election of directors. 292  Under the amended rule, 
companies can still exclude shareholder proposals for director elections 
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under certain specified scenarios (e.g., if the proposal would remove a 
director prior to the expiration of his term).293 
Shareholders should use proxy access to increase boardroom 
diversity. In particular, shareholders should propose an amendment of 
the company’s bylaws pursuant to Rule 14a-8 to require the board of 
directors and other relevant stakeholders to consider gender diversity in 
the recruitment of senior management and director nominees. 
In 2013, the New York City comptroller, Scott Stringer, as 
investment adviser to the New York City Pension Funds retirement 
system, launched the Boardroom Accountability Project. The purpose of 
the program was to establish a “more diverse, independent and 
accountable” board of directors at U.S. public companies through proxy 
access. 294  His leading action involved submitting proxy access 
shareowner proposals to seventy-five companies in 2015.295 One such 
proposal filed with C.F. Industries Holdings Inc. asked the board of 
directors to broaden its recruitment efforts to include women and 
minorities, and to notify the shareholders of any attempts to increase 
diversity.296 Additionally, BlackRock Inc. revised its guidelines to resist 
the reappointment of board members who paid “insufficient attention to 
board diversity.” 297  As of 2015, over 100 U.S. companies have 
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supported proxy access bylaws that are in line with the NYC Funds’ 
conditions.298 
B. SELF-HELP FOR WOMEN 
For the first time in the history of the U.S., the number of single 
women is higher than that of married women.299 The rise of independent 
women marks the start of a new kind of identity for the American 
woman. History serves as a reminder that the driving force behind 
significant milestones for women’s rights are, in fact, women.300 In the 
nineteenth century, single women, including Susan B. Anthony, Jane 
Addams, Alice Paul, and Elizabeth Blackwell led the fight for suffrage 
and abolition, were leaders in the field of medicine, and founded 
women’s colleges.301 Women in the late twentieth century led the sexual 
revolution and women’s rights movements, resulting in positive legal 
and social changes for women.302 The rise of single women has changed 
the shape of families, and women’s participation in the workforce means 
that legislation must adapt to this change to address the realities of 
modern life. Single women rightfully demand equal pay, family leave, 
increased minimum wage, universal pre-K, reduced college costs, 
reasonable healthcare costs, and reproductive freedom. 303  A set of 
strategies that would permit women to devote time to both their careers 
and their families would help women attain senior positions 304  and 
compete on an equal footing with men. To enable a company to flourish, 
companies must relinquish the economic and social systems that 
encourage stereotypical categorization of males and females alike. 
However, the extent to which women will have an impact depends on 
women recognizing that they have political power and stepping up to 
exercise it and call for change. 
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Aspiring women must be outspoken and understand the steps 
necessary to achieve their goals. In order to close the gender gap at the 
top, women need to eliminate the internal barriers that exist within 
themselves by “leaning in,” in the words of Sheryl Sandberg, and 
creating careers that soar. 305  Women must focus on expanding and 
proving their abilities, their grasp of the industries, and their roles in 
reaching these goals, i.e., their “positional purpose.”306 
C. COMPANY EFFORTS 
Although women need to be reminded to reach for the top and 
remove internal barriers, this does not take the onus off of companies. 
Women can only get to the top when institutional barriers are removed. 
As Colantuono has stated: 
[W]e don’t want to put 100 percent of the responsibility on women’s 
shoulders, nor would it be wise to do so, and here’s why: In order for 
companies to achieve their strategic financial goals, executives 
understand that they have to have everyone pulling in the same 
direction. In other words, the term we use in business is we have to 
have strategic alignment.307 
Despite the fact that executives are familiar with this concept, 63% of 
companies lack it, which in turn means that these organizations are not 
guaranteed to hit their financial targets.308 Businesses, therefore, should 
take steps and develop initiatives to support gender diversity. By 
moving more women into high visibility roles, women will also have 
greater access to mentors and sponsors throughout their careers.309 
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Companies should develop formalized recruiting efforts and ensure 
they have nominating committees filled with a majority of outside 
directors.310 More outreach should be encouraged in recruiting efforts, 
and companies should expand their search beyond the standard pool of 
candidates. In an effort to “dispel the myth that the underrepresentation 
of women on corporate boards is a supply problem,” Catalyst is 
generating a catalog of female candidates who are prepared to be board 
members and already have the CEO stamp of approval.311 Nominating 
committees should take advantage of databases—developed by 
organizations such as Catalyst— of board-qualified female candidates. 
Companies should create a culture of inclusion, which welcomes, 
values, and leverages the benefits of diversity, thereby enabling women 
to grow. This can be accomplished through organizing seminars, 
keynotes, speakers, or panels on the barriers women face, and spreading 
awareness of the underlying cultural factors that are impediments to 
women’s success in the workplace. Such programs can signal to 
employees that gender diversity is an important policy on the company’s 
agenda. It is imperative that companies engage all employees, male and 
female, in their inclusion initiatives. To date, diversity programs are 
commonly absorbed with emboldening the minority crowd or educating 
the majority crowd about their prejudices.312 However, the two are not 
mutually exclusive. Effective and responsible leadership entails 
including “100% of the target audience.”313 
Corporations need to provide across-the-board recognition of the 
importance of raising children and preserving families. This vital work 
currently results in professional demotion instead of being rewarded for 
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its importance. 314  Appropriate acknowledgment of the challenges of 
child-rearing would resolve the inconsistencies between the hopeful 
advice given to women and the harsh realities of the workplace.315 One 
avenue companies can take is to provide coaching to new parents. The 
consulting firms Life Meets Work and Talking Talent are dedicated to 
training and instructing employers, and in some large companies, 
especially where employees have demanding work schedules, 
employees have started using such services.316 The coaching sessions 
can be done in-person, over the phone or through the web, and can be 
done individually or in group sessions. The goal of such coaching is to 
help parents manage their work and home responsibilities, set 
boundaries, prioritize their tasks, and facilitate their transition to 
parental leave.317 Companies that offer these benefits include MetLife, 
Deutsche Bank, Etsy, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and Grant Thornton. By 
providing such services, companies are showing employees that they are 
supportive and that they are taking active steps to change the work 
culture.318 
Another avenue companies can use to both retain women and 
recognize parenting challenges is to change the emphasis on face time in 
the office.319 The expectation in many industries today is that it is a core 
part of the job to arrive at the office early, leave late, and work on 
weekends. While the pendulum has undoubtedly swung too far toward 
too many hours spent in the office, there is still value (e.g., informal 
sharing of ideas or cross-pollination of views from various departments) 
in employees working in a communal area. However, with today’s 
technological advances, employees should not be compelled to remain 
in the office all hours of the night when the same work can be done 
remotely. If a parent can periodically leave the office early to see to their 
child rearing responsibilities, it would create a culture more 
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accommodating to working parents. This workplace flexibility would 
not only benefit working parents, but would also likely produce more 
satisfied and productive employees. 
D. DISCLOSURE 
Many of the barriers to women’s representation relate to the 
policies and practices within the corporation itself. Compelled 
disclosure with respect to these topics would allow shareholders to 
better scrutinize the environment for diversity within a corporation. 
Specifically, Regulation S-K should be amended to require greater 
disclosure with respect to (i) the director nomination and election 
process, and (ii) the company’s policies and efforts regarding gender 
diversity. Regarding the director nomination procedures, SEC disclosure 
requirements should be amended to define diversity more specifically, 
e.g., to include gender, race, and ethnicity rather than just allowing 
companies to interpret diversity however they please.320 The SEC should 
also create a universal template that every public company would be 
required to use to present the qualifications of director candidates.321 
According to Regulation S-K, companies are required to disclose their 
processes for evaluating nominees for director positions, but they are not 
required to have a diversity policy. 322  If companies do not have a 
diversity policy, they should be required to disclose such information 
and the underlying reason as well. Additionally, companies should be 
required to disclose the information they consider during the nomination 
process. This would hopefully encourage boards (or their nominating 
committees) to look at different sources and organizations that have 
already put in the effort to find qualified women to serve on boards.323 
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While diversity in the composition of a company’s board is crucial, 
companies should also have policies that are designed to promote 
diversity among management and employees. Many companies have 
handbooks or information online regarding their business operations and 
policies, but currently, there is limited information that is required to be 
included in the material. Companies should be compelled to disclose 
narrative descriptions of (1) maternity, paternity, and child care policies 
(“Familial-Related Policies”); (2) the number of men and women at each 
level utilizing the Familial-Related Policies; and (3) the number of men 
and women at each level of management. The aim of these disclosures is 
to remedy the issue of women’s low retention rates and their absence in 
the higher ranks of corporations. By coercing companies to make these 
disclosures, directors and shareholders will be obligated to pay closer 
attention to the current landscape of the workplace and remedy the 
obstacles in women’s paths to board positions. 
CONCLUSION 
Women have made great progress in the boardroom over the past 
four decades. This has enabled a new type of conversation—not one 
focused merely on getting women in the door, but on closing the gap at 
the top. There are real barriers that women face: prerequisite 
qualifications, the lack of workplace flexibility in adapting to parenting 
needs, the male dominated culture in the boardroom, gender behavioral 
disparities, the differences in guidance and mentorship for females and 
males, and the general desire to maintain a certain corporate culture. 
These obstacles are tangible and must be acknowledged and remedied. 
These issues could be remedied through enhancements to the proxy 
process and company disclosure requirements. By requiring companies 
to provide the necessary information and context regarding diversity and 
by improving the voting process, stockholders will have the knowledge 
and ability to effectuate change. While women need to step up, 
companies and shareholders do as well, and should take steps to adopt 
policies that encourage women’s development and inclusion in the 
workforce and on boards. 
 
